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Nowadays, it is hard to imagine our lives without constantly being exposed to news about 
wars, international conflicts, and natural disasters. People learn from news media about what is 
going on in the world. And the news media determine stories that their audiences will talk about 
for the next few days. However, news outlets present slightly different representations of the 
world by concentrating on different details and facts. By doing so, each news organization, in a 
way, creates a new reality where the events presented are only a reflection of what really 
happened, which could affect people’s opinions on public affairs depending on the outlet(s) from 
where they get their news (McCombs, 2014).  
Even though politics may be perceived as a field where people may manipulate 
information, it is not normatively true. Obtaining information about current events is important 
for making appropriate political decisions. Hochschild and Einstein (2015) noticed that the use of 
incorrect information and the failure to use correct information “stand in opposition to the view 
of almost every serious thinker who has considered how to make democratic governance stable 
and effective” (p. 586). Moreover, moving from the active use of misinformation to the new 
understanding of facts “not only requires a great effort but also increases dissonance and 
discomfort” (p. 624).  
Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, and Rich (2000) pointed out that the difference 
between being “uninformed” and being “misinformed” is in the fact that the former is about not 
having a belief about the correct answer to a factual question and the latter is about holding a 
false or unsupported belief about a fact. The (2000) study highlighted that “not only does this 
misinformation function as a barrier to factually educating citizens, it can lead to collective 




informed” (Kuklinski et al., 2000, p. 792). Later, Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, and 
Cook (2012) supported earlier findings, saying that “if individuals are misinformed, they may 
likewise make decisions for themselves and their families that are not in their best interest and 
can have serious consequences” (p. 107). 
The 2016 presidential elections have brought attention to the “fake news” phenomenon. 
After being mentioned numerous times by Donald Trump, this term has become commonly used 
in the political background to explain away any type of negative and inconvenient information 
(Blom, forthcoming). News media raised a question about the consequences of “fake news” and 
misinformation for democracy. It was noticed by Botei (2017) that “fake news” could influence 
American citizens’ opinions during the elections and, thus, influenced the election’s outcome.  
According to the Pew Research Center, most Americans suspect that “fake news” is 
having an impact. About 64% of U.S. adults say fabricated news stories result in a great deal of 
confusion about the current issues and events (Mitchell, Barthel, & Holcomb, 2016). 
Additionally, according to this research, this sense of confusion is shared widely across incomes, 
education levels, partisan affiliations, and most other demographic characteristics. 
Even though “fake news” is a relatively new term, the misinformation and manipulation 
of public opinion has existed for a long time caused by the development of communication 
channels for propaganda purposes and their impact on society. Jowett and O’Donnell (2006) 
explained propaganda as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist” (p. 7). They continued that the motives of propaganda were not necessarily 
negative, and judgment depended on the ideology it supported. They used the example of Voice 




U.S. government-funded international multimedia agency; however, in the former Soviet Union, 
it was known as a radio broadcast. Established in 1942, it transmitted in Russian language from 
their headquarters in Washington, DC. At that time, it was a source of world news and popular 
western music.  
More specifically, the people who listened to the VOA found satisfaction for their hunger 
for information, and thus the VOA had altruistic motives. However, the information they 
received from the VOA was “ideologically injected to shape positive perceptions about the 
United States and its allies and to manipulate attitudes toward democracy, capitalism, and 
freedom” (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006, p. 14). Most American citizens would not find these ideas 
as negative, but the communist government in the USSR did (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006).   
The reason why people are easily manipulated by misinformation is in the way humans 
perceive information. According to Southwell and Thorson (2015), when people evaluate new 
information, they only concentrate on a few characteristics. They consider the consistency of 
new information with their “existing set of beliefs, assessing whether an idea fits previously held 
notions” (Southwell & Thorson, 2015, p. 590). Thus, skepticism toward new information is not 
“the norm” for news consumers, and they can easily believe in news that coincides with our pre-
existing attitudes, even when the information is false or misleading. 
This thesis analyzed how U.S. citizens perceive information about an international 
conflict involving the Russia. It focused on the hacking issue during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
campaign.  
Situational background 
On November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President of the United 




connections to Russia. Reviewing the situation, Yorish, Buchanan, and Watkins (2018) noticed 
that it was easy to lose the narrative in the Trump-Russia story given the relentless pace and 
complexity of the news. Stepping back to view the timeline from the beginning reveals parallel 
threads—contacts, hacking, and social media fraud—often crossed during the elections. 
For several months, almost every news media outlet in the U.S. highlighted the role 
Russia had in the hacker attacks on the servers of the U.S. Democratic Party. After the elections, 
Robert Mueller was appointed by the Justice Department to lead a special investigation to find 
whether Russia was involved in the cyber threats to support Trump and whether the president’s 
associates colluded with Russians (Tsynareva, 2017). 
Russia dominated the national political conversation after Trump was elected. American 
intelligence agencies concluded that President Vladimir Putin personally ordered the campaign 
to interfere in the election (Yourish et al., 2018). Dozens of people had been charged by Robert 
Mueller, the special counsel investigating possible links between the Trump campaign and 
Russian officials. Trump denied the validity of the investigation, posting hundreds of tweets. The 
special counsel charged 13 Russians and three companies with carrying out a massive fraud 
against the American government and conspiring to obstruct enforcement of federal laws 
(Yourish et al., 2018). 
Following that, the U.S. news media revealed the information about the Russian 
influence campaign on social media in the 2016 election. According to a report produced for the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, Russia used an array of tactics to try to sway American opinion 
and divide the country (DiResta et al., 2018). It highlighted the Internet Research Agency that 
created social media accounts under fake names on every available social media platform 




the presidential race, then in the general election, and as president since his inauguration 
(Shane & Frenkel, 2018). 
As of March 2019, even though there have been more details and opinions about Trump’s 
ties to Russia and the hacking issue, the situation is still far away from being fully resolved. 
The differences in news media coverage play a role in the audience’s perception of 
political news. Thus, this study attempted to answer the following questions: Why do people 
believe some news sources and not others? What defines news trust? Despite strong interest in 
the news media influence on people’s mind, the problem of why people trust or do not trust a 
particular source is still among the most important topics. Understanding how people perceive 
news articles can help to teach people critical thinking about information they get from news 
media and deal with misinformation.  
This study investigated to what extent American citizens believed news media covering 
an international issue depending on the source. The object of the study was the Russian-
American conflict—the hacking issue that took place during the 2016 presidential campaign in 
the U.S. Therefore, this study was an attempt to understand to what extent the audience trusted 
the news media’s coverage of an international conflict involving Russia depending on the news 
source, particularly whether the story was from U.S. or Russian outlets. 
Literature review 
In democratic systems, news media are actively involved in the interpretation of political 
reality and therefore in the framing of political alternatives. Street (2011) noticed that news 
media coverage was presenting a version of the world where news media first had to persuade 
their audience of its veracity through the use of various techniques. Second, the character and 




general points, in Street’s (2011) opinion, are considerable significance for the way people think 
about how news represents politics. The logic here is that news programming can be understood 
as another media product, like soap operas, chat shows, drama series, and lifestyle magazines. 
All of these products have a particular history and are the result of a particular concatenation of 
interests.  
Most of the time news media coverage of politics resembles a plot full of twists and turns 
so people sometimes can be tricked into what to believe. For example, Zoonen (2005) stated that 
politics needs drama, and therefore storylines and personalities are not the issue: “The issue is 
the forms into which they are molded by historical cultural environment” (p. 7). Street (2011) 
added to this—“the way the story is told determines the way the political process is imaged” (p. 
62). Moreover, some political events can be perceived as an established genre in media. For 
instance, “elections are covered as if they are sporting encounters” (Street, 2011, p. 63).  
News media coverage of the political process differs among countries because of other 
societal norms and journalist practices or routines. However, according to Street (2011), it is 
always about the same central process: creating a story. Of course, this story is not a “mirror” of 
a real political situation but an assemblage of news media and political influence. In other words, 
“covering politics means creating a believable story about actors and agencies deemed to be 
important” (Street, 2011, p. 75).  
Research on perceptions of news media includes analyzing diverse concepts. Current 
research is going to open the discussion with agenda-setting theory review because this theory 
attempts to explain the way people perceive news media and how they influence our minds. 
Then, the concept of media trust and media bias perception will be examined. More specifically, 




misinformation—the phenomenon that has been actively discussed among researchers, media, 
and global community. Finally, the phenomenon of news content expectancy will be reviewed in 
terms of its influence on media trust.  
Agenda-setting theory  
 Historic overview. 
Agenda-setting theory explains how much attention a particular topic gets from the public 
based on the amount of attention that a topic gets by the news media. If the topic is on top of 
current agenda, it may influence public opinion and the public's broader understanding of social 
problems (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). In this process, the concept of gatekeeping is important to 
mention. All news media have a gatekeeping mechanism because from all variety of events 
going on around the world they choose what information to pass and what to reject. Moreover, 
not all the events that made it be included in news media agenda are presented equally. 
Newspapers, for example, can reveal their assessment of an issue through the length of the 
headline and the place within the newspaper. Agenda-setting theory assumes that the audience 
"learns their topic saliences from these judgments of the news media, incorporating a similar set 
of weights into their personal agendas" (Weaver, McCombs, & Spellman, 1975, p. 460).  
A long time before that, Lippmann (1922) discussed how news media construct the 
reality for people and influence their perception of the world in his book Public Opinion. He 
explained how the news media can create “the pictures inside our heads” (p. 29) that determine 
our cognitive maps of the world. In his words, public opinion responds not to the real 
environment but to the “second-hand” environment (p. 205) formed by the news media. In his 
words, “the only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the 




explore and to construct their “reality.”  
Weaver et al. (1975) discussed the role of media during the Watergate crisis, stating that 
people not only learn about issues, they also learn "how much importance to attach to an issue 
from the emphasis placed on it by the mass media" (p. 459).  
 Current state of agenda-setting theory. 
Many scholars have examined the way people perceive the pseudo-environments 
constructed by news media. For instance, McCombs (2014) considered news media a “second-
hand reality” for people. This reality is structured by news, reports, and journalists. Through their 
day-to-day selection of news, editors and news directors focus people’s attention on small set of 
news stories and thus influence people’s perceptions of what the most important issues of the day 
are. Over time, issues covered by news media become the most important among the public. By 
placing the topic on the public agenda so it becomes the focus of public attention and, possibly, 
action, the news media construct the public opinion (McCombs, 2014). 
At all times, scholars tried to accurately capture public opinion. The most frequently used 
survey item to measure the public’s agenda is the so-called “most important problem” (or MIP) 
poll question developed by George Gallup in the 1930s in the United States (What do you think 
is the most important problem facing this country today?) (Yeager, Larson, Krosnick, & 
Tompson, 2011). The MIP question has become the focus of research on public opinion as well 
as news media agenda-setting theory. The analysis of the MIP question done by Yeager et al. 
study (2011) showed that at that time the economy was placed at top priority as a result of news 
media agenda-setting. However, the latest poll showed the change in people’s perception of the 
most important problem. For example, currently, U.S. citizens named the most important 




Following the findings of earlier study of agenda-setting, scholars came to the conclusion 
that the media are influential in telling us not only what to think about (first-level agenda), but 
also how to think about issues (second-level agenda-setting, or framing). Elaborating on the 
second-level agenda-setting, McCombs and Estrada (1997) offered that Bernard Cohen’s (1963) 
famous statement of the media influence should be reformulated to state that “the media may not 
only tell us what to think about, they may also tell us how and what to think about it, and even 
what to do about it” (p. 247).  
Moreover, previous research found that the public’s attention to an issue directly depends 
on the number of news media pieces covered this issue (McCombs, 2014; Semetko, Brzinski, 
Weaver, & Willnat, 1992; Wanta, 1997; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986). More specifically, Wanta 
(1997) stated: 
Agenda-setting, then, is a type of social learning. Individuals learn about the relative 
importance of issues in society through the amount of coverage the issues receive in news 
media. Thus, the more coverage an issue receives, the more concern individuals have 
with the issue. In other words, individuals learn how concerned they should be through 
the amount of coverage the issue receives (p. 2). 
 International angle of agenda-setting theory. 
People often don’t have direct experience with news events in foreign countries. 
Therefore, the only source of information about world events is the news media. However, 
according to Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004), news media focus their coverage of international 
news events on a limited number of nations and regions. This lack of balance in coverage is 
likely to influence Americans’ view of the saliency of international events. More resent research 




most interested in news that’s close to home. More specifically, in the U.S., 57% follow news 
about their country very closely whereas only 17% expressed the same idea about international 
news.  
When researchers looked at agenda-setting from the international angle, they concluded 
that stories of international conflicts have the stronger influence on public opinion; thus, people 
pay more attention to the coverage (Wanta & Hu, 1993; Wanta et al., 2004; Besova & Cooley, 
2009). Basically, these conflict stories dramatize their own fears of safety and danger (Wanta & 
Hu, 1993).  
According to McCombs (2014), agenda-setting effects depend on people’s familiarity 
with an issue. Issues people deal with on a daily basis are obtrusive issues, and issues that people 
cannot experience are considered unobtrusive issues. International conflicts are considered to be 
unobstrusive issues, which is why according to agenda-setting theory, it will have greater effects 
on public opinion (Besova & Cooley, 2009).  
Wanta and Hu (1993) defined four categories of news coverage that demonstrated the 
strongest agenda-setting influence for American citizens: international conflicts involving the 
United States; terrorism involving the U.S.; crime/drugs; and military/nuclear arms. Among 
them, the stories with high degrees of conflict and stories with concrete presentations (by 
including Americans in the stories) had the strongest agenda-setting impact. For example, the 
news coverage of international conflicts involving the United States has led to the increasing 
public concern (also in Besova & Cooley, 2009; Semetko et al., 1992). In the current research, 
when the news media talked about the hacking it meant that every individual could become a 
victim of the invasion in their personal life. Thus, the personal relevance made it to be more 




News media trust and media bias perception 
The concept of news media credibility is related to the general concept of trust in news 
media. Trying to identify trust, Coleman (1990) explained it as the relationship between trustor 
and trustee. In this relationship, the trustor places trust and they are “better off” when the trustee 
is trustworthy (Coleman, 1990, p. 98).  
According to Tschannen-Moran and Hoy (2000), trust depends on “what one expects of 
another on the basis of norms of behavior or role expectations. In addition, most relationships of 
trust do not take place in a vacuum; they are embedded in social contexts that impose constraints, 
values, and sanctions that affect the trust relationship” (Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000, p. 570).  
When it comes to trust in media, it is hard to understand “why” since the interaction 
process between the media and its audience is comprehensive. Cappella (2002) stated that in past 
decades people’s trust in media “changed from low to a very low “low” (p. 231). The author also 
observed the general trend that social trust, institutional trust, and civic engagement have been in 
decline. What is more interesting, Cappella (2002) claimed news media to be partly responsible 
for the declining trust in social capital saying that it is in the core values of media to be biased:  
The media don’t lie in any technical sense. They simply do what politicians regularly do. 
They reel a version of the truth that is slanted, spun in particular ways. What particular 
ways? Toward replication. If the media can indeed see their stories replicated on the 
minds and words of their readers and consumers and by the imitation of their 
competitors, they have been successful transmitters of culture (p. 240).  
In the era of misinformation, it only gets easier for news media to “play” with the 
audience’s opinion, because people now are struggling to distinguish false information from the 




assessment of American students’ media literacy demonstrated that majority of them (more than 
80%) struggled to distinguish a news story from news-like “sponsored content” and recognize 
possible biases of politically charged tweets (Wineburg, McGrew, Breakstone, & Ortega, 2016). 
According to Lewandowsky et al. (2012), individuals were more likely to believe information if 
it followed a logical narrative, came from a source they trust, it was consistent with their 
preexisting knowledge, and seemed to be something other people believed.  
At the same time, Gottfried, Stocking and Grieco (2018) stated that trust in news media 
in the U.S. fell down drastically. In 2018, only 21% of respondents stated that they had a lot of 
trust in national news organizations. In contrast, the data from 2011 (Pew Research Center) 
showed the trend when the news organizations were criticized but actually trusted more than 
government (69% compared to 51%, respectively). 
Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985) initially found that content designed to be as neutral as 
possible was perceived as biased in different directions by partisans on one side or the other 
depending on their political ideology. Basically, they provided evidence that people may agree 
that the coverage was biased but completely disagree about the direction of such bias. Moreover, 
they found that when people perceived political information in news media “the more radical 
mechanism” kicked in (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 578). More specifically, “the two partisan groups 
may perceive, or remember, very different stimuli; each partisan group may report that the media 
spent the most time and gave the most emphasis to the other side” (Vallone et al., 1985, p. 579). 
However, both sides felt that they were treated unfairly.  
Eveland and Shah (2003) later supported Vallone et al. (1985) original findings stating 
that people who have “high levels of ideologically like-minded discussion tend to hold stronger 




discussions” (p. 113). Thus, the more people are involved in the political life, the stronger their 
perceptions about news media bias will be. More specifically, people may agree that the 
coverage is biased but completely disagree about the direction of such bias.  
The recent research by Knight Foundation and Gallup (2018) supported this idea, 
stating, “partisans rate news stories as more or less trustworthy depending on whether the source 
is viewed as sympathetic or hostile to their political preferences” (p. 6). In this study, 
they compared how people perceive articles depending on if they knew the source or not. Their 
investigation showed significant connection between the outlet and trustworthiness of 
news. Democrats rated liberal sources to be more trustworthy and conservative sources as less 
trustworthy when they could see the source of information during the research. In contrast, 
Republicans considered conservative outlets more trustworthy and liberal news media less 
trustworthy. Essentially, people with more extreme political views tend to have more perceived 
bias of news. More specifically, those who defined themselves as very liberal or very 
conservative marked 43% of articles to be biased, whereas those who defined themselves as 
moderate found just 31% of articles to be biased. However, the “blinded” group that was not 
exposed to a news source logo was more trusting of the news content. Therefore, “the brand 
reputation of these sources affects perceived trustworthiness of the content more than the 
information presented” (p. 8).   
On social media, Democrats and Republicans were both 15% more likely to believe 
headlines that aligned with their preexisting political beliefs, according to Allcot and Gentzkow 
(2017). Moreover, this inference gets substantially stronger for people with “ideologically 
segregated social media networks” (p. 213).  




they analyzed how people with different political affiliations perceived factual or opinion news 
articles and if they could detect the difference between them (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & 
Sumida, 2018). The results showed that both Republicans and Democrats were more likely to 
think news articles are factual when they appealed to their side—even if they were opinions.  
Hypotheses development 
This study investigated to what extent the audience believed news media covering an 
international conflict involving Russia, particularly whether the news was attributed to U.S. or 
Russian outlets depending on the news source. It analyzed how news source trust factors into the 
audience’s perception of political news. This provided a better understanding of what makes 
people believe some news sources and not believe others.  
According to Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, and Trammell (2005), the tie between news 
media and the government has influenced the specifics of news media coverage, and that's why 
there is no "universal expectation that news media in different countries will cover a major news 
event in the same way" (p. 24).  
According to Lecheler (2010), continuing focus of news media discourse on a specific 
political issue may cause citizens to “recognize connections between an issue and their personal 
self-interest, identification with a country, or their basic values" (p. 51). When concentrating on 
the special circumstances of the hacking issue that involved two countries in a conflict, it was 
expected that the news media coverage of that issue would be perceived differently by different 
groups of people. Thus, the level of believability—in particular news stories—could depend, for 
example, on their political views or general attitude toward Russia. More specifically, it was 
expected that when people were exposed to a news story from a source whose country of origin 




did not know to which country a particular news story was attributed to, they would consider it 
more neutral and thus, more believable. The current study manipulated two news sources—RT 
and Russia Today—in order to test the following hypotheses: 
H1a: U.S. news consumers consider a news story more believable when it is attributed to 
a Russian news source whose country of origin is not specified in its name compared to a 
Russian news source where ‘Russia’ is visible to the reader/viewer.  
Additionally, similar relations were expected in terms of news source trust. When the 
audience was not familiar with the source it would be more trustworthy compared to a source 
attributed to Russia. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H1b: U.S. news consumers consider a Russian news source whose country of origin is 
not specified in its name more trustworthy compared to a Russian news source where 
“Russia” is visible to the reader/viewer.  
At the same time, even though news media sources are generally expected to give the 
same information about current issues, the level of believability would be influenced by people’s 
existing prejudice and personal beliefs. Therefore, it was anticipated that the attitude toward 
political news content would be different whether the story was attributed to the U.S. or Russian 
news sources.  
H2a: U.S. news consumers consider a political news story more believable when it is 
attributed to U.S. news sources compared to Russian news sources. 
Moreover, it was implied that stories not related to politics should be covered similarly in 
different news media. The reason for that is that the neutral story about something that happened, 
for example, a natural phenomenon, should not activate personal bias or conflict of interest. In 




stories would have the same level of believability regardless of the messenger.  
H2b: U.S. news consumers consider a non-political news story equally believable when it 
is attributed to U.S. and Russian news sources. 
Research on expectancies has found that people expect sources to take positions in their 
own self-interest, and when this does not occur (i.e., when a source disconfirms the expected 
position), it results in greater attributions of source trustworthiness and message validity (Petty, 
Fleming, Priester, & Feinstein, 2001). 
Kelley’s attribution theory (1973) proposed that a person’s explanation about “why” 
communicators advocate particular positions affect the persuasive power of the message. He 
referred to attribution theory as a theory about how people make causal explanations: about how 
they answer questions beginning with "why?" In addition, Kelley noticed that when something 
violates a receiver’s previously held position it pushes one to reassess the situation and 
understand why a communicator changed the view.  
Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken (1978) argued that a receiver might have a preexisting 
expectation about what another communicator was planning to address. This expectation was 
based on the previous experiences with the communicator or the background information about 
the source. Their experiment showed that regardless of bias recipients expected from the 
communicator, they were more persuaded when their expectancies were violated. Additionally, 
recipients rated the communicator as more unbiased when he/she didn’t take the expected 
position. In contrast, the message was considered more biased and insincere when it was 
expected by recipients. 
Following that, Petty et al. (2001) stated that when the source disconfirms expectancies 




the source might overcome all the potentially biasing factors. For example, a politician would be 
expected to take a pro-environmental stance in a speech to a group of environmentalists because 
it is in the politician’s self-interest to do so (i.e., obtaining the votes of the group). If the 
politician does not do this, he or she is assumed to be speaking the truth.  
Similar results were supported by Blom (2018) when it was indicated that news 
believability was predicted by a combination of news source trust and news message expectancy. 
The study investigated to what extent US citizens believed false information and did not believe 
factual information about the current state of illegal immigration. The data demonstrated that 
distrusted news sources could be more believable when people had not anticipated that particular 
content. When interacting with news media sources, people form their expectations for a 
particular outlet. Traditionally, the more expected the message from a news source, the higher 
the believability. However, deviations from these expectations lead to expectancy violations. As 
a result, when a person does not anticipate particular content from a distrusted news source, the 
level of believability of that message is increasing. In an expectancy-violation situation, 
distrusted sources can sometimes demonstrate the higher level of believability compared to 
trusted news sources (see also: Petty et al., 2001).  
Current study attempted to investigate whether the interaction between news source trust 
and news content expectancy influences the level of believability in news. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H3: Highly expected news content from trusted news sources is more believable than 
highly expected news content from distrusted sources. 
More specifically, when comparing trusted and distrusted sources news believability, it 




highly expected content from distrusted sources. At the same time, highly unexpected news 
content from untrusted sources could be even more believable than highly expected content from 
trusted sources (Blom, 2013). 
Method 
News sources 
This study analyzed how people perceived information on the same international topic 
from different news outlets. The focus on the American audience was chosen because they 
represent the effected side of the conflict as well as the government issues are at the top of MIP 
(Most Important Problem; Gallup, 2018); thus, the news media coverage of the hacking issue 
should be more relevant to them.  
This study focused on American and Russian news media, and thus, three outlets were 
chosen in order to represent diversity in opinions. For American news outlets, two sources were 
chosen: One source that is considered to lean more toward liberal views (CNN) and one toward 
conservative (Fox News). Iyengar and Hahn (2009) stated that news-media source preference 
depends on a person’s political affiliation. More specifically, conservatives and Republicans 
prefer to read news attributed to Fox News. At the same time, even though Democrats and 
liberals prefer to get news from a variety of resources, CNN is found among the most popular 
news sources (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009).  
For the Russian news outlet, RT (Russia Today) was chosen because it is the most well-
known resource representing the Russian government position on the world news media arena. 
The channel is available for most cable and satellite providers and is present on the Internet, 




In addition to American and Russian news sources, BBC was added to the questionnaire 
items measuring source trust. The following was done so the initial focus of the study was not 
become obvious for participants. Being asked only about Russian and American news sources 
could have led to some sort of priming effect that would influence the answers to the trust scale. 
Sample  
The experiment included 198 undergraduate students aged 18–26 years old from a 
midsize Midwestern university (M = 20.8, SD = 1.4). About two-thirds of the participants 
identified as female. A little over one-third identified as male and one person preferred not to 
identify. Half of the sample identified more with the liberal political ideology, whereas a quarter 
of the sample identified more with the conservative political ideology. Another quarter of the 
sample did not lean toward one of the two ideologies. Similar splits were reported for the 
political party item. 
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the cells in a 2 (news content type 
political/non-political story) × 4 (news source: RT, Russia Today, CNN, Fox News) factorial 
design (see Table 1). They then were randomly divided into 8 groups for each condition. 
Students received extra credit in exchange for their participation.  
Experimental stimuli 
There were two types of experimental stimuli in this experiment: story (2×) and news 
sources (4). This resulted in a total of 8 experimental conditions (see Table 1). The experiment 






Political story RT Russia Today CNN Fox News 
Non-political story RT Russia Today CNN Fox News 
 
For a political story condition, the story about 12 Russian intelligence officers who were 
indicted for hacking the Democratic party was chosen. To show control conditions, a neutral 
story—not related to politics—was chosen. However, the story covered a meteor’s explosion in a 
Russian region, Ural, in 2013, and thus could be attributed to international news.  
RT is a Russian international news network funded by the Russian government. Formed 
in 2005, Russia Today was rebranded as RT at 2009. Since there is no direct mention of Russian 
affiliation in a current version of the news source name, RT and Russia Today were presented as 
separate news outlets in order to see how people’s perception depends on whether they know that 
they are exposed to a Russian news source or they do not. 
The participants were exposed to one news story: either political or non-political (see 
Appendix A). These stories were attributed to either RT, Russia Today, CNN, or Fox News. The 
logos of each news outlet were presented with the story to emphasize the news source 
manipulation.  
Procedure 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight experimental conditions. 
They were first asked to evaluate their trust to news sources listed in the questionnaire. Then, the 
participants were asked to read a news story and answer the questionnaire about it. The content 
for the experiment consisted of two news stories adapted by length from the original sources (see 




attribution. Each story was designed based of using Chrome web browser on an Apple computer 
device. A standardized news web story design was chosen in order to minimize distractions and 
focus participants’ attention on the content of the story.  
Since the study involved measuring attitudes toward Russia, the data was gathered by a 
researcher not associated with this study in order to minimize the researcher’s bias.  
Questionnaire items 
News source trust. 
In previous research about news media credibility, scholars came up with different 
factors defining the concept of trust. Gaziano and McGrath (1986) offered to group 12 items 
together in a credibility factor in order to evaluate how people perceive the media. Among these 
components is being trustworthy, fair, unbiased, complete, factual, and accurate. Later research, 
however, criticized this approach and offered an alternative and more concise option for 
measuring media credibility. Meyer (1988) offered to measure the extent to which a news media 
source was perceived as fair, unbiased, telling the whole story, accurate, and trustworthy. Even 
though this paradigm was proposed at the end of the 1980s, it is actively used in modern media 
research (Kiousis, 2001; Greer, 2003; Oyedeji, 2007; Choi & Lee, 2007; Roberts, 2010; Blom, 
2018). Thus, this study used Meyer’s paradigm of measuring trust in media source.  
In academic research on media perceptions, there has been an overlap between the 
concept of media trust and media credibility. According to Blomqvist (1997), scholars often use 
trust and credibility as synonyms. However, Brandts (2012) identified credibility as one of the 
components of media trust. Trust has traditionally been explained as an “outcome of an 
interaction process in which trust relationships develop gradually” (Blomqvist, 1997, p. 280). 




study used the larger concept of media trust in order to measure people’s attitude toward specific 
news media sources.  
Participants were asked this question before exposed to a particular story (see Appendix 
B). Meyer’s 5-item scale was used as an indicator of news source trust. Participants evaluated the 
news story via a 5-point scale that included the following considerations: fairness, bias, 
thoroughness, accuracy, and trustworthiness.  
For CNN, a confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax 
rotation with one factor explaining 72% of the variance. All items in this analysis had primary 
loadings over .7. Four items had a loading of at least .85. Internal consistency for the scales was 
examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.90). 
For Fox News, a confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax 
rotation with one factor explaining 72% of the variance. All items in this analysis had primary 
loadings over .7. Internal consistency for the scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.90). 
For RT, a confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax rotation 
with one factor explaining 68% of the variance. All items in this analysis had primary loadings 
over .7. Internal consistency for the scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.88). 
For Russia Today, a confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using 
varimax rotation with one factor explaining 82% of the variance. All items in this analysis had 
primary loadings over .88. Four items had a loading of at least .85. Internal consistency for the 
scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.95). 
In addition, according to the collected data, it needs to be mentioned that the participants 
were divided into two groups: one group was asked about their perceptions of RT (N = 102) and 




(N = 51) was not familiar with this news source. At the same time, 28% of the Russia Today 
condition was not familiar with the source (N = 27).  
 News content believability. 
After exposure to the story, news trust believability was measured using a scale designed 
by Flanagin and Metzger (2000) that was developed to judge the credibility of online 
information. For each of four news media sources, participants were asked to rate the degree that 
they found information on the medium to be believable, accurate, trustworthy, biased, and 
complete on a 5-point scale (see Appendix B).  
Analyzing the Meyer (1988) and the Flanagin and Metzger (2000) scales, Roberts (2010) 
noticed that these instruments were quite similar. He first utilized both scales working together 
(Roberts, 2010). More specifically, the Meyer (1988) scale was used to evaluate the level of trust 
to the messenger (the source) whereas the Flanagin and Metzger (2000) scale measured the level 
of believability to a particular message (Roberts, 2010).  
A confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax rotation with 
one factor explaining 61% of the variance. All but one item in this analysis had primary loadings 
over .75. The one item with a lower loading was retained, because the scale has been validated 
by previous research (Roberts, 2010; Blom, 2018). Internal consistency for the scale was 
examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.86). Participants responded on a 5-point scale, where a lower 
score indicated higher believability. 
News message expectancy  
After indicating the news believability level, the participants were asked to respond to the 
news content expectancy item (Blom, 2018): “CNN (Fox News, RT, Russia Today) claims that 




answer on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = ”strongly agree” (see 
Appendix B).  
A confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax rotation with 
one factor explaining 70% of the variance. All items in this analysis had primary loadings over 
.7. Internal consistency for the scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha (.86).  
Russia attitude scale. 
In order to estimate attitude toward Russia index, the study adapted the Salter and Teger 
(1975) scale for measuring attitude. Participants were asked to rate their feelings about (1) the 
country in general, (2) its culture, (3) its internal governmental systems, (4) the country as a 
tourist destination. Participants were able to respond in a 5-point Likert scale with 1 = “very 
negative” and 5 = “very positive.” The four items were averaged to become one variable 
identifying attitude toward Russia (see Appendix B). 
A confirmatory factor analysis of the items was conducted using varimax rotation with 
one factor explaining 50% of the variance. One item has a loading of .79, however the loadings 
for the other three items were below .7. Internal consistency for the scales was examined using 
Cronbach’s alpha (.66). As a result, the validity and reliability of the scale did not perform as 
well as expected. Because of the low sample size in the study it was already challenging to add 
more independent variables in the regression analyses. Therefore, the Russia scale was not used 
for the statistical analyses (see Appendix C). An informal check indicated that the scale did not 
influence the results.  
Interaction 
The interaction between news source trust and news content expectancy was measured by 




centered by subtracting those scores from the sample mean for each variable.  
Statistical analysis 
Missing data points were replaced with values gathered after five multiple imputation 
rounds with IBM‘s SPSS Statistics 25 program. There was no missing data for eight variables 
out of 42. For 22 variables 2% or less data were missing or participants answered “don’t know” 
for news source trust items where that was an option. Two more variables demonstrated 3% of 
missing data. Only for items on RT (25.4%), Russia Today (13.6%), and BBC (8.3%) the amount 
of missing data was extraordinary high, but only because many of them indicated “don’t know.” 
Even though those data were not missing in the literal sense, because most participants answered 
“don’t know” for all items of a particular scale it was not possible to impute missing data points. 
Therefore, those participants were automatically excluded from statistical analyses including 
those scales.     
The multi-item scales were checked for outliers. It was determined that there were no 
data points three standard deviations from the mean. Therefore, no participants were excluded.   
A series of t-tests was conducted to address H1a and H1b. ANOVA was conducted to 
measure H2a and H2b. The results determined whether there was a significant difference 
between the believability and trust levels for different news media sources. In addition, the 
interaction between news source trust and news source expectancy (H3) was tested with ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression.  
Results 
The primary goal of the study was to analyze the concept of news believability in terms 




The study suggested that U.S. news consumers would consider a news story more 
believable when it was attributed to a Russian news source whose country of origin was not 
specified in its name. On the contrary, a news story from a Russian news source where ‘Russia’ 
is visible to the reader/viewer was expected to be less believable (H1a). Therefore, the difference 
in perceptions of RT and Russia Today was analyzed.  
An independent-samples t test indicated that a news story attributed to RT (M = 2.9, SD = 
0.7) was less believable than a news story attributed to Russia Today (M = 3.1, SD = 0.8). The 
mean difference was relatively small, which resulted in a statistically non-significant finding, 
t(95) = 1.54, p = .13. As a result, there was no evidence in support of H1a. The results were 
similar when political and non-political stories were analyzed individually.  
At the same time, a similar hypothesis about the trustworthiness of a Russian news source 
whose country of origin was not specified in its name compared to a Russian news source where 
‘Russia’ was visible to the reader/viewer was supported by the statistical results. 
An independent-samples t test indicated that the trustworthiness of RT (M = 3.1, SD = 
0.4) was higher than the trustworthiness of Russia Today (M = 2.2, SD = 0.9). The mean 
difference is quite considerable, which resulted in a statistically significant finding, t(117) = 
6.41, p < .001. These results provided evidence in support of H1b.  
Table 2 
News content believability means 
ANOVA 
News Source Political news story  Non-political story 
CNN 3.2 (0.5)  3.2 (0.7) 




RT 2.8 (0.7) 2.9 (0.8) 
Russia Today 3.0 (0.7) 3.2 (1.0) 
Participants responded on a 5-point scale, where a lower score indicated higher believability. 
Means for news content believability for all eight conditions. Standard deviations in parentheses.  
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to seek out differences in believability of a political 
news story from U.S. and Russian new sources: CNN (M = 3.2, SD = 0.5), Fox News (M = 3.0, 
SD = 0.6), Russia Today (M = 3.0, SD = 0.7), RT (M = 2.8, SD = 0.7). There were no statistically 
significant differences among the news sources, than F(3,96) = 1.05, p = .13. Therefore, there 
were no differences between U.S. and Russian news sources, which resulted in no evidence in 
support for H2a (see Table 2).  
Since the ANOVA analysis did not report statistically significant results, a post hoc test 
was not technically required. However, the tendency of the statistical data suggested that if the 
sample size was larger, the results could have been statistically significant. In that case, a post 
hoc analysis would have been warranted. The attempt of running an LSD post hoc analysis 
demonstrated a statistically significant difference between CNN and RT (p = .020) for a political 
news story. The mean difference between CNN and RT was .4069 (see Appendix D). These 
results gave some evidence in support of H2a, because RT is the main Russian news network in 
the U.S. and CNN is a worthy representative for U.S. news networks. Therefore, there is 
evidence that people's cognitive biases interfere in the believability of news coverage about 
important international affairs. 
The study hypothesized that a non-political story condition would demonstrate equal 
believability for U.S. and Russian news sources, because the news story would be considered 
more neutral and thus perceived less critically (H2b). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to 




sources: CNN (M = 3.2, SD = 0.7), Fox News (M = 3.0, SD = 0.8), Russia Today (M = 3.2, SD = 
1.0), RT (M = 2.9, SD = 0.8). There were no statistically significant differences among the news 
sources, than F(3,96) = 1.05, p = .37. Therefore, there were no differences between U.S. and 
Russian news sources, which provided evidence for support in H2b (see Table 2).   
Table 3 represents the results of the interaction between news source trust and news 
content expectancy. It was noticed that the interaction was a statistically significant predictor of 
variance in news content believability only in one condition (CNN political story). The rest of 
statistical results provided no evidence in support for H3.  
Table 3 
Regression results of the interaction between news source trust and news content expectancy 
Source Political news story  Non-political news story 
CNN .39 (< .05) .13 (.62) 
Fox News -.09 (.64) .42 (.07) 
RT .17 (.41) -.25 (.20) 
Russia Today .09 (.76) -.06 (.83) 
Dependent variable: Believability 
Beta-coefficients for the interaction for all eight conditions. Significance in parentheses. 
OLS: ordinary least square. 
For the CNN condition, the independent variables explained about 44% of the variance in 
news content believability for the political story: news source trust (β = .59, p = .001), content 
expectancy (β = .39, p < .05), and the interaction (β = .39, p < .05). The interaction between news 




believability for this condition. For the non-political story, there were no statistically significant 
independent variables, although the beta-coefficients were between .13 and .26.  
For the Fox News condition, the independent variables explained about 13% of the 
variance in news content believability for the political story. There was only a main effect for 
news source trust (β = .47, p < .05). For the non-political story, the independent variables 
explained 19% of the variance in news content believability. However, there was only a 
statistically significant result for news content expectancy (β = .54, p < .01). Even though the 
interaction was not statistically significant (p = .074), there was a moderate beta-coefficient of 
.42.  
For the Russia Today condition, the independent variables explained about 0% of the 
variance in news content believability for the political story. There was only a moderate beta-
coefficient of .24 for content expectancy. The independent variables explained about 22% of the 
variance in news content believability for the non-political story. News source trust was the only 
statistically significant predictor (β = .61, p < .05).  
For the RT condition, the independent variables explained about 1% of the variance in 
news content believability for the political story. There was only a moderate beta-coefficient of 
.26 for news source trust. For the non-political story, the independent variables explained 39% of 
the variance in news content believability. Only content expectancy was a statistically significant 
predictor (β = .54, p < .01), however there were moderate effect sizes for news source trust (β = 
.25, p = .217) and the interaction (β = -.25, p = .201).   
Discussion 
The news media influence and people’s perceptions of the news media have been the 




perceive international conflicts. Due to the examining of news media coverage of the same 
political issue in different outlets—the hacking scandal during the 2016 presidential elections—
this study contributed to further research on the connections between media, political 
communication and people’s perception of news. According to McQuail (1994),  
The news media are both a product and also a reflection of the history of their own 
society and have played a part in it. Despite the similarities of mass media institutions 
across societies, the news media are by origin, practice and convention very much 
national institution and respond to domestic political and social pressures and to the 
expectation of their audience. They reflect express and sometimes actively serve the 
"national interest", as determined other, more powerful actors and institutions (p. 121).  
The study investigated to what extent U.S. news consumers believed news articles 
depending on whether it was attributed to Russian or U.S. news media outlets. Additionally, 
news source trust and concepts related to participants’ demographic information such as political 
identification and attitude toward Russia were examined in terms of the influence on people’s 
perceptions of the news coverage of an international issue.  
The study was based on two types of news stories (political and non-political) attributed 
to four news media sources, which resulted in eight experimental conditions. The Russian 
hacking issue during the 2016 presidential elections was chosen as the media background for the 
content of the study. The survey experiment method was chosen in order to examine the 
following questionnaire items such as news source trust, news content believability, news 
content expectancy, and attitude toward Russia. The experiment included a convenience sample 




statistical results of this study were mixed, it is worth recognizing that its findings acknowledged 
several trends in perception of international news sources and news stories.  
Considering previous research on agenda-setting which stated that the public’s attention 
to an issue directly depends on the number of news media pieces covering this issue (McCombs, 
2014; Semetko, Brzinski, Weaver, & Willnat, 1992; Wanta, 1997; McNelly & Izcaray, 1986), it 
was expected that the news media consumers’ perception of Russia would be influenced by the 
media coverage. Additionally, the fact that news media not only tell us what to think about, they 
also tell us how to think about it (McCombs & Estrada, 1997) should have effected not just the 
change in the audience’s perceptions but also resulted in a switch to a more negative attitude 
toward Russia and Russian media, in particular.  
The low levels of Russian attitudes was reflected in the study results. More specifically, 
58.6% of the sample reported negative attitude toward Russia, whereas 24.7% were neutral and 
only 16.7% had somewhat positive attitude toward Russia. Therefore, the study suggested that 
U.S. news consumers would consider a news story more believable when it was attributed to a 
Russian news source whose country of origin was not specified in its name (RT) compared to the 
one with “Russia” in its name (Russia Today). In contrast to previous research, which pointed 
out that people were more likely to believe information if it was consistent with their preexisting 
knowledge (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), that statement was not supported by the current study. 
The difference between believability levels for RT and Russia Today stories was not statistically 
significant.  
In the last couple of years, researchers have reported a drastic decline in news media trust 
in the U.S. (Gottfried, Stocking, & Grieco, 2018). Thus, this study attempted to measure if there 




sources, the one without attribution to Russia (RT) turned out to be more trustworthy rather than 
the news source with Russian attribution in its name (Russia Today). The results supported the 
idea that people were less likely to trust the news source that had negative connotation. 
This study showed that in most cases participants did not recognize RT being a Russian 
news source. Russia Today changed its name to RT in 2009. However, the editor-in-chief 
Margarita Simonyan denied that the reason for changing the name was disguising its roots (Von 
Twickel, 2010). The findings of the study reflected that RT turned out to be more trustworthy 
compared to Russia Today among U.S. news consumers. That meant even though officially the 
name change was not purposed to “hide” the country in its name, the data collected in this study 
indicated that it definitely increased the trust to this news source among their potential audience.  
The previous research argued that political identification could influence people’s 
perception of political news. For example, it was found that Democrats and Republicans were 
more likely to believe news that align with their preexisting political beliefs (Allcot & 
Gentzkow, 2017). In this study, however, it was noticed that political identification variable did 
not contribute much toward variance in believability in combination with the main variables in 
this study, namely news source trust, news content expectancy, and the interaction between 
them.  
The study used four items to measure the attitude toward Russia such as perception of the 
country in general, its culture, and the government. Participants were also asked to evaluate 
Russia as a tourist destination. The Russia attitude scale, however, did not reach satisfactory 
reliability levels. The confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the items were related, but not 
to satisfactory levels. The cronbach’s alpha was not as high as desirable. Therefore, for future 




Further, the study investigated how the participants perceived political news stories 
attributed to U.S. and Russian news media. Based on the assumption that news consumers prefer 
domestic news (Mitchell et al., 2018), it was expected that news stories attributed to U.S. news 
sources would be more believable than news stories attributed to Russian news sources. 
However, the study did not find a significant difference between Russian and domestic news 
sources in statistical results. Interestingly enough, additional statistical tests showed a significant 
difference in believability for CNN and RT political news stories, in particular. These results 
gave supported the idea that news media consumers in the U.S. had a higher level of believability 
for domestic news sources rather than international. Therefore, there was evidence that people's 
cognitive biases interfere in the believability of news coverage about important international 
affairs. 
In academic research, it was found that stories of international conflicts involving the 
United States had the stronger influence on public opinion (Wanta & Hu, 1993; Wanta et al., 
2004; Besova & Cooley, 2009). Therefore, it was expected that a political news story would be 
perceived differently rather than a non-political one. The study attempted to examine the 
difference in perception of a news story that was not related to politics. It was expected that the 
more neutral news story would be perceived more equally because it lacked any conflicts and 
contradictions with people’s existing knowledge and beliefs. Indeed, according to statistical 
results, a non-political story demonstrated the same level of believability.  
When interacting with news media sources, people’s expectations influence their 
believability in a news story. Traditionally, the more expected the message, the higher the 
believability. However, when a person perceive unexpected content from a distrusted news 




et al., 2001; Blom, 2018). Therefore, the study examined the interaction between news source 
trust and news content expectancy and evaluated its influence on news believability. The results 
showed that the interaction turned out to be a statistically significant predictor of variability in 
news believability only for one condition (CNN, political story). For that condition, independent 
variables explained about 44% of the variance in news believability. Therefore, it can be stated 
that the study only partially supported previous research findings. The fact that the interaction 
did not show statistically significant results for a non-political news story was expected. The 
reason for that was that the news story lacked strong partisan angles and conflicting ideas, either 
Russian vs. non-Russian, or liberal vs. conservative. 
Multiple studies discussed the deteriorating nature of misinformation for the society 
(Kuklinski et al., 2000; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Botei, 2017). Even though it is not a new 
concept, the attention to this phenomenon increased dramatically with the 2016 presidential 
elections being a starting point. Now it only gets easier for news media to “trick” the audience, 
because people often cannot distinguish false information from the facts (Wineburg et al., 2016). 
Consequently, the Pew Research Center reported that “fake news” resulted in a great deal of 
confusion about current issues among U.S. citizens (Mitchell, et al., 2016). Since the current 
study observed concepts of news believability, news source trust, and news content expectancy, 
its findings can contribute to a future research on news media perceptions. More specifically, it 
can help teaching people more critical thinking and developing the instruments for dealing with 
misinformation and propaganda. Simply by realizing why an individual trusts a specific news 
source or a news story can play a big role in making important decisions and having an accurate 
picture of the world.  




(Russia Today) within a week. Even though BCC has been reported as one of the most trusted 
news sources among the U.S. news consumers (Mitchell et al., 2014), only 42% of participants 
stated that they looked into news from BBC. When comparing the U.S. media, the situation was a 
little better, because participants reported that they came across news attributed to CNN in 77% 
and news attributed to Fox News in 49%.  
The mixing results of the study supported the idea that there is a big portion of confusion 
among the U.S. news consumers when it comes to choosing a trustworthy news source where 
they can gather the important information about current events. No one would argue that the 
traditional news media still set up the public agenda and influence people’s perceptions of 
important issues even though the growing use of social media may also contribute to shaping 
people’s mind. Therefore, the ability to identify “fake news” matters for guiding political and 
electoral decisions. However, the results of this study indicated that people’s own cognitive 
biases play an important role in perceptions of media bias. Enhanced media literacy training is 
needed for people to better understand their own cognitive biases in this process. 
Limitations and future research 
The design of the current study had a few limitations that need to be addressed in future 
research. Mixed results could be explained by a smaller sample size and a convenience sampling 
type. The sample consisted of undergraduate students of a midsize Midwestern university. With 
a larger audience and more various demographic groups the results might demonstrate more 
significant difference. For a future research development, it could be recommended to include 
randomly selected participants in the sample. Additionally, it would be beneficial to include 
different age ranges and racial identifications. So that the findings of the study may be extended 




Since this study mostly focused on the influence of the news source on the content 
believability, researchers should further study how the audience perceives full news articles. 
More specifically, what parts of the message news consumers pay attention to and what parts 
they skip. Extending this idea, it could be also tested what is more important—the source (the 
messenger) or the message (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000). The participants of this study were 
strictly presented shortened and standardized articles to avoid confounding factors that could 
take place in full news coverage. For instance, original news stories would likely include more 
facts as well as links to related news materials to support their position. Obviously, this could 
influence audience’s perceptions that would affect in the level of believability. Since this is an 
important area for future research, the current study provided a concentrated analysis of the role 
of the news source in trust on the basis of two particular news stories. 
Mitchell et al. (2018) noticed that news consumers are most interested in news that is 
close to home. Since people are less interested in international news, there is not much research 
done on international news sources and their comparison with the U.S. sources in academic 
research. Therefore, future research could address that issue by conducting more studies focusing 
on international news from multiple countries representing different cultural background.  
Future research could also include measures involving cultural background, prejudice, 
and stereotyping to explain differences in cognitive perceptions among news consumers. In 
addition to that, internal psychological characteristics involving mood and attention as well as 
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News source trust   
(Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree or disagree/Somewhat Agree/Strongly 
Agree) 
 
Please respond to the following statements about news networks: 
 
If you would watch a news story from [CNN, Fox News, RT (Russia Today), BBC], would you 
expect it to be… 
Fair    
Unbiased   





News content believability 
(Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree or disagree/Somewhat Agree/Strongly 
Agree) 
 
What do you think the odds are that this specific article from the website of [CNN, Fox News, 







Can be trusted 
 
News message expectancy 
(Strongly disagree/Somewhat disagree/Neither agree or disagree/Somewhat Agree/Strongly 
Agree) 
 
[CNN, Fox News, RT (Russia Today)] claims that this article is factually true. What do you 










Political ID questions 
(Strong Democrat/Leaning Democrat/Neither Dem/Rep/Leaning Republican/Strong Republican) 
 
What political party do you identify most with? 
 
(Strong Liberal/Liberal/Neither Lib/Con/Conservative/Strong Conservative) 
 
How would you describe your political ideology? 
 
Russia Attitude Scale 
(Extremely negative/Slightly Negative/Neutral/Slightly Positive/Extremely positive) 
How do you feel about Russia as a country? 
 
How do you feel about Russian culture? 
 
How do you feel about the Russian government? 
 


































Russia attitude scale and histogram 
Table 1. Russia attitude scale results (frequencies). 5-point Likert scale with 1 = “very negative” 
and 5 = “very positive.” 
Figure 1. Attitude toward Russia scale. 5-point Likert scale with 1 = “very negative” and 5 = 






LSD post hoc analysis table 
Table 1. Results for an LSD post hoc analysis 
 
 
